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Thinking about Technology 
and Institutions
Joel Mokyr
I. Introduction
Economics, Oscar Wilde is reputed to have said, is so easy that even a
parrot could learn it by mindlessly repeating the words “demand and
supply.” But as all Econ majors know, the seemingly simple diagram
can actually lead to some rather hairy problems with counterintuitive
solutions. The same is true for other issues in economics. At first
glance, it seems obvious that technological progress leads to some-
thing we can call “improvement” through enhanced living standards.
What could be a more straightforward insight than to argue that
human ingenuity supplies us with the ultimate “free lunch,” the capa-
bility to have at the same time more guns and more butter? The 20th
century has been a century like no other in human history. In terms of
our material welfare—our ability to extend the length and improve the
quality of human life and to reduce the many material discomforts that
accompany poverty, malnutrition, disease, and uncertainty — the 20th
century can boast achievements that exceed those of the total sum of
all history before 1900. This simple-minded version of economic
growth posits that technological change is the source of prosperity,
wisdom, and bliss.
The story here, however, turns out to be more complicated than the
freshman courses suggest. For one thing, if technical knowledge is at
the source of most modern wealth, why doesn’t everyone have it?
Knowledge is a pure public good; by giving some away, those who
have it do not have less. If the main reason Germany is richer than
Zimbabwe is that the Germans know things that Zimbabweans do not,
why don’t they just teach them? The answer that economists have tra-
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ditionally given is that Germans are better educated and trained, and
are thus more capable to use and absorb the technical knowledge. In
the lingo of economics, human capital and technology are complemen-
tary. But this argument does not seem to hold up very well either. If
human capital was the limiting scarce resource in poor countries, it
ought to have a high price there, and we should see German and
Japanese engineers traveling to Zimbabwe or Paraguay. Such a flow of
human capital can readily be seen in early 19th-century Europe when
English and Scottish engineers traveled to the European continent and
taught the locals what the British had learned during the first Indus-
trial Revolution.1 But today this diffusion is not happening. In fact,
highly educated engineers and physicians from Asia and Africa settle
in the West if they can. If poor countries are so low on human capital,
why is there a “brain drain” flowing out of these countries? A possible
answer is one of complementarities within rather than between produc-
tion factors. In other words, trained and skilled people are most pro-
ductive when they are with other people like them. For example, an
Indian computer engineer will be more successful (and thus richer) if
he works in Santa Clara or, if he stays in India, in Bangalore, because in
Silicon Valley and Bangalore, there are people that he can swap ideas
with and learn from. Significant complementarities mean that there
could be more than one outcome, or to use the “economese” expres-
sion, there could be “multiple equilibria.” If the elements that make a
nation rich are complementary to one another, the implication is that
those that do well will do even better and those that do poorly will do
worse and worse, at least in relative terms. For every poverty trap,
there is a riches trap. Fairly small differences in initial conditions could
lead to historical bifurcations.
The data bear this story out. The basic fact that needs explanation
has been whimsically referred to by economists as “twin peaks.”2 It is
the observation that the countries of the world seem to be falling into
two groups: the rich industrialized countries with high incomes, and
the poor countries that are falling further and further behind. Income
per head tends to be bimodally distributed. This is, of course, a rough
generalization. There are always some countries in between, but the
sense is that such countries are either on their way up to join the club
of the rich or on their way down to join the bottom-dwellers. But what,
really, causes such divergent historical trajectories? Books with titles
such as “How the West Grew Rich” or “Why Some Nations are Poor
and Others are Rich” keep coming out.3 Culture, institutions, luck, nat-
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ural resources, even climate (or distance from the equator) have all
been proposed. Our problem, it seems, is not too few, but too many
explanations.
II. Institutions versus Technology in Economic Growth
What, then, accounts for this pattern? Basically, economies can grow
for three reasons.4 One is thrift. If they save a lot of their income, they
accumulate more capital, meaning that in the future they will have
more. With each worker having more equipment and tools to work
with, he or she is more productive and the economy grows in per
capita terms. The problem with this story is that of diminishing
returns. As the economy has more and more capital, each addition
contributes less and less, and the payoff for savers declines. Much of
the earlier formulation of neoclassical growth theory in the 1950s by
Robert Solow and his followers was based on the growth in the capital-
labor ratio.
The second mechanism of growth is technology, sometimes referred
to as “Schumpeterian Growth.” We need to keep in mind that technol-
ogy is always and everywhere knowledge. It is not the artifact, not the
tools, not even the pages of the manual. It is what is in people’s minds.
Technology is, however, a very special and specific kind of knowledge.
In its basic form, technology consists of instructions or recipes on how
to make things or supply a service. But these instructions are based on
background knowledge of natural phenomena and regularities that
can be exploited to yield these instructions. As people learn more
about nature and the physical world, they can write better instructions
and enjoy better ways to manipulate nature — that is, to produce. We
have come to associate such background knowledge as coincident with
science, but in reality it is much more. It is a vast set of facts, phenom-
ena, and regularities about the natural world known to us. For exam-
ple, the discovery of the New World by Europeans added a piece of
background knowledge to European societies, namely, that there was
a large landmass between them and Asia, and the new navigating
instructions were based on this knowledge. It is important to note that
the generation of new technology is rarely costless. In modern society,
the costs of Research and Development should be factored in as an
input into the function that produces new technology. Some econo-
mists have gone so far as to view new knowledge as just another input
produced by and in the system, subject to more or less the same rules
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as any other.5 Historically, however, the costs of technological change
have been minuscule compared to its benefits even if we take into
account the hidden costs of unsuccessful searches.
Innovation or new knowledge that is useful for productive pur-
poses has some odd characteristics. It does not seem to satisfy most of
the attributes that make for commodities that can be traded in markets.
The first and most obvious characteristic is that techniques are
unquantifiable and do not even satisfy the laws of arithmetic: one
invention plus one invention may equal just one invention if the sec-
ond replaces the first, or they may equal more than two if the two tech-
niques can be combined into a third one. They can be substitutes or
complements for existing technology. Thus, inventing the glider plus
inventing the internal combustion engine did not just equal those two
but combined to produce the airplane. The second characteristic,
already alluded to, is that new technology, like all new knowledge, is a
public good, and that more people acquiring it does not diminish what
is left for others. This means that for first-order efficiency, it should be
given away freely. Doing so, however, means that there is no real
incentive for would-be inventors to allocate their talents and efforts
toward the hard and frustrating work often involved in Research and
Development (R & D). To make innovation attractive, someone has to
be given the rights to make scarce something that inherently is not.
This, in a nutshell, is the dilemma of intellectual property rights. Even
if we could assign such rights perfectly, however, there remains the
further problem that most of the benefits — 80 percent, in a recent cal-
culation — accrue to others beside the inventor. Unless inventors are
very altruistic beings, societies will tend to underproduce new knowl-
edge.
To be sure, institutions exist to some extent to reward people who
make such contributions to society beyond the purely monetary. The
French kings under the pre-revolutionary ancien régime awarded
medals and pensions to persons who had distinguished themselves in
their service to “the Kingdom.”6 Today, we do the same with Nobel
prizes, national medals, and presidential honors for unusually distin-
guished inventors and scientists. Fortunately, moreover, money and
honors are not the only things that make researchers and innovators
click. Such external motives as curiosity, a desire to impress one’s
peers, a dedication to one’s nation or humanity at large, or just a sin-
gle-minded obsession with an unsolved problem — all tend to reduce
the built-in propensity of society to underproduce useful knowledge,
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but there is no sure way of knowing whether this fully bridges the gap
to make the social rate of return on R & D equal to the private one.
Most evidence suggests that it does not, and that knowledge is still
underproduced.
The other problem with innovation as a market-produced commod-
ity is that its supply curve is not well defined. It is easy to say that 
R & D is sensitive to market demand and that the production of new
technology has become, to a large extent, routinized and inevitable.
But what technology will emerge? The constraint on new technology is
in our minds. It is ultimately what we know how to do and what is
beyond us because we simply do not know enough. It is easy to think
about many inventions that would have made someone hugely
wealthy and done society a lot of good, but which have not yet come
forth, largely because society does not know enough. Examples
include an effective means to kill harmful insects without killing other
living beings; cures for a host of diseases from the common cold to
AIDS; laptop batteries that will hold a charge for the length of a flight
to Tokyo; controlled nuclear fusion as a source of cheap energy; or a
way to gorge down huge meals without becoming obese. The failure of
such techniques to emerge despite huge research efforts indicates that
the growth of technology and that of economies using them is gov-
erned not just by market forces but also by the evolution of more
abstract human knowledge underpinning these techniques.
It seems proper to ask what we can possibly mean when we say that
“something is known.” The only possible interpretation of such a state-
ment is that at least one person included in the society knows.7 But from
an economic point of view this is not terribly meaningful. If one person
has some knowledge but does not share it with anyone, its usefulness
will be limited. What matters above all is the question of what access
those who could apply this knowledge have to it? What is the cost of
acquiring it? These access costs are in part determined by technology
and by the costs of storing, reproducing, and transmitting knowledge.
Inventions such as writing, paper, printing, the telegraph, and so on,
affect these costs. In part, however, they are determined by the culture
and institutions that govern the communications between scientists
and experimentalists on the one hand, and the farmers in the fields and
the technicians in the workshops who might use it. These flows of
information are essential if an economy is to grow as the result of
inventions.
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The third way in which economies can grow is through institutional
change, sometimes known as “Northian Growth.”8 Institutions are the
rules of the economic game played by society. They include formal
rules (laws, regulations) as well as informal ones (customs, conven-
tions, manners, traditions), and the penalties for their violation. The
general idea is that in order for an economy to grow, it needs to
become more efficient, and that the main way economies grow is
through the development and expansion of markets. But markets are
often limited and incomplete because it is costly and risky to operate in
them. Institutions are the mechanism by which such transaction costs
are reduced. To most political scientists and historians, this argument
sounds so obvious and commonplace that it barely needs reiteration.
But the mechanisms by which institutional change leads to economic
growth are often left unspecified. Let me propose a number of quite
different stories one can tell here.
The best-known mechanism through which institutions facilitate
economic growth is through the support of commerce and trade. Econ-
omists since Ricardo have delighted in showing how mutually advan-
tageous exchange can benefit both sides, a classic example of growth
occurring through a positive-sum game (sometimes referred to as
“Smithian growth”). What appears today to be so obvious to all but
Congressman Gephart was, in fact, misunderstood by politicians and
philosophers until the great minds of the Scottish Enlightenment,
Adam Smith and David Hume, pointed it out. But to have such trade,
one needs more than good transportation and communications. It
requires the ability to write contracts that are enforced either by a for-
mal set of laws or by informal customs such as trust and reputation. It
requires above all curbing the opportunistic behavior of dishonest or
violent economic agents (including, of course, pirates and highway-
men, but also rulers, generals, and priests in charge of society). The
idea that the “rule of law” ensures the realization of the gains from
trade has become commonplace. What is perhaps less obvious is that
markets and exchange depend greatly upon solutions to problems of
asymmetric information. Employers cannot watch their employees
continuously, so the employees know more about how much effort
and skill they put in. Customers cannot examine the full characteristics
of the product or service they buy. Stockholders have but limited
knowledge of what CEOs really do and depend on the same CEOs to
tell them. The more these so-called principal-agent issues can be
Macalester International Vol. 13
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resolved, the more efficiently the market mechanism can operate and
the faster an economy can become wealthy.
Before the Industrial Revolution of the later 18th century, much, if
not most, economic growth was spawned by such trade-generating
mechanisms. Medieval Europe, Song China, and South Asia experi-
enced considerable economic growth due to the expansion of markets
and long-distance trade. Yet most of the gains must have been due to
the operation of local markets, growing trade between neighboring vil-
lages and towns, and the specialization in farming and crafts that this
trade implied. Recognizing this allows us to define the concept of eco-
nomic modernity with some precision. The most important change
over the past two centuries following the Industrial Revolution is not
only the huge expansion of such trade, but the growth of exchange
between perfect strangers who may never trade with one another
again.9
Historically, however, economic systems whose wealth was based
on local and long-distance trade have been quite vulnerable to political
shocks. The wealth of the Roman Empire, based on the legal and polit-
ical cohesion of the empire, is a prime example. The loss of the
Mediterranean to the Muslims in the 7th century caused much of the
international trade of Europe to cease, and helped plunge Europe into
a few centuries of destitute economic backwardness.10 The Thirty-
Years War in Germany in the first half of the 17th century reduced
most local markets to ashes and set the country’s economic develop-
ment back by a century or more. The global economy that emerged
after 1870 — thanks to the train, the steam ship, the telegraph, and the
gold standard — was abruptly terminated in 1914 and took decades to
recover.11 Even today, it is felt that a few determined terrorist acts
could well inflict enormous damage to the flow of goods and services
across the world. The need to inspect every shipping container for
unconventional weapons, for instance, would impose intolerable costs
and delays on the effectiveness of trade.
In addition to those institutions that make markets for goods and ser-
vices work properly, there are those that make the market for factors of
production work well. Each worker that is moved from a low produc-
tivity job in the countryside to a high productivity job elsewhere
increases output, and such flows can generate a great deal of growth.
For this to happen at a continuous rate, institutions have to be in place
that may reallocate factors of production to those who can use them
most efficiently. Smoothly functioning real estate markets (through
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well-defined title registration systems) are an example of institutional
support for the better allocation of resources simply because they
would allow those economic agents who can best take advantage of a
resource to exploit it. Through much of history, such markets have
done a poor job, and farmers of vastly differing competence and ability
have been tilling the land side by side, although economic efficiency
would suggest that the more competent farmer buys out his neighbor.
Labor mobility, financial institutions, well-organized insurance mar-
kets, and the free flow of economic information are very much a part of
growth. As Hernando De Soto stressed in his widely discussed book,
just rearranging and properly assigning the property rights on real
estate may lead to a great deal of efficiency.12 One reason is that well-
defined property rights and enforced contracts are needed to secure
collateral on loans. But credit markets need a lot more institutional
support than just the proper assignment of formal title in order to
work correctly. Rules that ensure that the information put out by bor-
rowers (or those who issue equity) is reliable and trustworthy, and that
those in charge of verifying it are themselves worthy of trust, are
clearly part and parcel of it. (Enron shareholders would wistfully
agree.)
Institutions also determine the payoff to human effort and talent.
Nations have finite supplies of talented, original, and ingenious minds.
Whether such individuals will become mafia chiefs, military leaders,
priests, philosophers, or entrepreneurs and engineers is determined by
the payoffs that society sets up for these people. Recent research has
recognized that a dollar made in what is known as rent-seeking activi-
ties, such as insider trading, manipulating regulators, and ensuring
monopolies through raising entry barriers, as well as extortion, corrup-
tion, and kickbacks, is just as much a dollar as one made in developing
new markets and products. From the point of view of the economy,
however, entrepreneurial activity is enriching, while rent-seeking is
impoverishing. The choices of where to allocate their talents and ener-
gies are made by economic agents on the margins, determined by the
payoffs and penalties set by institutions.13 One such institution, of
course, is “culture,” or, better put, ideology, which claims that some
activities are morally superior even if their payoff is not quite high
enough to allocate the right amount of resources to this activity. Public
service is viewed as in some sense “good” in order to make up for the
low pay compared to alternative occupations.
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Institutions have in recent years made a triumphant comeback to
the mainstream of economics after having been banished for many
decades to such unspeakable places as sociology departments. Econo-
mists increasingly stress that the rules of the economic game are them-
selves the outcome of complex interactive multiplayer games, and if
game theory predicts anything, it is that in such settings many differ-
ent outcomes are possible, and therefore we should not be surprised
that different historical circumstances have produced very different
institutional outcomes, with obvious economic implications.14 Even
within the industrialized West, the legal and social environment in
which the economy operates differs greatly. Switzerland, Japan, and
the United States have quite different institutions, yet all have been
amenable to generating and absorbing advanced technology. Unlike
Tolstoy’s observation that all happy marriages are the same and only
the unhappy ones are unhappy in their own unique way, not all roads
to economic prosperity have followed the same institutional pattern.
To summarize, we have three ways in which an economy can grow.
We can carry out mental experiments to have one without the other
two. It is easy to show, for instance, how in an economy with a com-
pletely fixed technology, we can have growth simply due to better
allocations and gains from trade. On the other hand, even with fixed
institutions, some inventions can suddenly augment the economic
potential of a society. But history is rarely kind enough to allow us to
experiment with such “pure” forms of economic change. Only models
allow us to do that. Models are simplifications that strip away much of
reality to focus on a particular aspect in order to establish causal con-
nections. History is a confused and complex mess. Unfortunately for
theorists and contrary to the protestations of the postmodernists, his-
tory—unlike models and metaphors—is real.
III. The Beginnings of Modern Growth
The economic history of the twin-peak syndrome seems to have
started in Europe at around 1750.15 Until that time, economic growth
had been slow, spasmodic, and in some cases reversible. Although by
1700 a few enclaves of wealth and prosperity had been established in
the great commercial and manufacturing centers of the United
Provinces and England, most of Europe still consisted of a poor rural
class, desperately trying to eke out a living between an unproductive
agriculture and an unmechanized manufacture. Europe had experi-
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enced periods of growth, but with a few exceptions these had fizzled
out. Perhaps the comparison between Western Europe and the richest
parts of China in the Yangtze valley or Japan is misleading, as some
have argued, since living standards in Africa and Oceania were clearly
lower than anywhere in Eurasia.16 But Europe as a whole was not as
rich as the Netherlands. In southern, central, and eastern Europe, the
vast bulk of the population was rural, and as late as 1750 lived on the
verge of subsistence. A good way to characterize the economic history
of the “big picture” is to say that each episode of growth ran into some
obstruction or resistance that put an end to it.17 Growth occurred in rel-
atively brief spurts punctuating long periods of stagnation or mild
decline. After such episodes, the economy asymptoted to a higher
steady state, creating something of a “ratchet effect,” but growth could
not be sustained.18
What explains this dynamic pattern? Until 1750, the slow economic
growth in the world can be explained in terms of negative feedback
effects. This occurs when the result of an input tends to weaken the
supply of that very input, so that whatever movement occurs in the
relevant variable eventually settles down. Negative feedback is stabiliz-
ing in that change tends to produce forces that weaken the forces of
change and eventually cause it to come to an end. These feedback
mechanisms in the economies of pre-Industrial Revolution Europe
(and other areas) worked through a variety of different channels, but
they all resulted in a self-negating pattern of economic growth. In truly
dialectical fashion, economic expansion created the causes of its own
demise. Thus, inexorably, each period of economic expansion was fol-
lowed by a slacking off and sometimes a reversal of economic growth.
Three basic mechanisms account for these feedback effects.
One such mechanism is standard Malthusian population dynamics,
still taken quite seriously by many scholars as a good description of
pre-modern population change.19 When income per capita rises,
Malthusian models predict a population increase since fewer people
die from starvation and disease, and perhaps people become more fer-
tile when they are wealthier. Such a population increase will at some
point run up against some fixed resource, often believed to be food
supply or fertile farmland, but quite possibly some other resource such
as energy supply or clean fresh water. The fixed physical environment
creates what economists call “concavity” in the production function
that, together with the Malthusian response, guarantees stability.20 The
existence of Malthusian negative feedback does not guarantee stabil-
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ity. Overshooting can occur, in which overpopulation can trigger a
mechanism that wipes out far more than the number of people needed
to restore demographic equilibrium. Many scholars have seriously
questioned whether this model is historically accurate.21 The best
answer I can give is that its application is historically contingent upon
the particular situation. If all other things are equal, including the stock
of human knowledge and the infrastructure of the economy, the con-
cavity of the production function is simply ineluctable. But if these
other things are not only not fixed but actually a sufficiently steep pos-
itive function of population size (a rather strong condition), we can see
how these Malthusian constraints may be overcome systematically
and eventually lose all relevance. Thus, it has been argued that inven-
tion itself is a function of population size and density, since sparsely
populated areas do not generate enough organized and shared knowl-
edge to make technological progress possible. Whether that kind of
relation can be extrapolated into higher and higher densities, as Julian
Simon has argued, seems more doubtful.22
A second type of stabilizing mechanism deals with the limitations
on human knowledge. Techniques are supported by background
knowledge about natural regularities in the behavior of the physical
world and the properties of materials, energy, machines, plants, and
animals. Before 1750, the bulk of the techniques in use anywhere in the
world rested on very little understanding. Production processes were
based on knowledge that certain techniques worked and others did
not, without much understanding of why and how they worked. What
was known had largely been discovered serendipitously or through
trial-and-error experimentation. It is not an exaggeration to say that
most technology consisted of engineering without mechanics, iron
making without metallurgy, farming without organic chemistry, ani-
mal breeding without genetics, water power without hydraulic theory,
food preparation without nutritional science, and medical practice
without physiology and microbiology. This very limited and essen-
tially steady state base constituted a “fixed factor” that lent the system
a kind of concavity that we normally do not associate with knowledge.
Great inventions were almost inevitably followed by a process of trial-
and-error improvement that soon fizzled out and stabilized at a tech-
nological level far below what could have been attained with a little
better understanding. This may sound somewhat patronizing in the “if
they only knew what we know” mode, but no such attitude is
intended. All the same, we need to realize that it is precisely the
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growth of what societies knew that loosened the constraints on eco-
nomic performance.
There can be little doubt that knowledge has imposed such con-
straints on all societies, including our own, and that we can see how
when these ceilings were hit, growth was checked. The growth of agri-
cultural productivity due to the adoption of convertible husbandry in
the 17th century increased agricultural output, but despite improved
crop rotation, the growth of output slowed in the 18th century.23 The
techniques used in metallurgy, printing, shipbuilding, mining, and
water mill construction (which had all advanced remarkably in the
15th and early 16th century) seem to have stabilized for centuries, sim-
ply because the knowledge base had been exhausted. The point is not
just that the operators of techniques (that is, producers, artisans, farm-
ers) themselves were unaware of the principles of physics and chem-
istry that underlay the techniques they carried out; that remained true
much later and is largely the case in our own time as well. The point is
that nobody knew. Operational techniques soon reached ceilings that
might have been broken had someone understood a bit more as to why
they worked. The processing and manipulation of materials, the use
and design of instruments and machines, the utilization of energy, and
the raising of edible crops and animals were little informed by theory
because there was little theory. What this implied was that even when
certain techniques were known to work, it was exceedingly unlikely
that they would be constantly improved, adapted to new applications,
or combined with others to form novel ones. Even those groups of peo-
ple that engaged in systematic searches for better techniques made few
advances, simply because they did not know why things worked, and
hence could not predict what would not work. Alchemists (scientists
in search of the Philosopher’s stone, the fountain of youth, and perpet-
ual motion machines) spent huge amounts of time and resources
exploring what we know today to have been blind alleys.24
The third source of negative feedback is institutional in nature.
When economic progress took place in a society or region, it frequently
generated a variety of social and political forces that ended up termi-
nating it. Above all, the prosperity and success of any society or town
led to the emergence of predators and parasites in a variety of forms
and guises who eventually slaughtered the geese that laid the golden
eggs. Tax collectors, foreign invaders, pirates, and rent-seeking coali-
tions (such as guilds and government-enforced monopolies) eventu-
ally extinguished much of the growth of northern Italy, southern
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Germany, and the Low Countries.25 The great commercial expansions
of the 16th century were followed by the rise of mercantilism, which,
in one interpretation, was little more than an attempt to capture the
rents generated by growth. What was not fully understood was that
trade was not a zero-sum game, and thus an attempt to increase a
share had the inevitable result of reducing everyone’s income. The
Wealth of Nations was in part an attempt to make this basic point. It
seems reasonable to surmise, for instance, that much of the economic
decline of Iberia in the 16th century and that of the United Provinces in
the 18th can be partially explained by such mechanisms. Perhaps the
most insidious of these forms of negative institutional feedback was
organized resistance to new technology by vested interest groups, a
phenomenon still quite visible in our own time.26
IV. A New Interpretation of Modern Growth
One way of looking at modern economic growth using this simple
framework is that these three negative feedback mechanisms have
been turned around and become positive. That is, we have moved
from a world in which success bred failure to one in which success
breeds more success and failure breeds more failure. Such models give
rise to growing disparities and “twin peaks,” since they imply either
what economists call multiple equilibria or, in some extreme cases,
perhaps no equilibrium at all. In such a world, luck plays a bigger role
and history’s path is determined by contingency as much as by deter-
ministic forces that social scientists can analyze.27 The AIDS epidemic,
much like the Black Death, may have a bigger impact on many
economies than all the social forces of production rolled into one.
But even when the forces at work are not due to accident, the desta-
bilizing influence of positive feedback can be discerned. Let’s take the
example of demographic negative feedback first. In the old demographic
regime described by Reverend Malthus, a rise in income per capita led
to increased fertility and reduced mortality, thus to more mouths to
feed on the same land and declining income. But in the modern world,
this has been turned around. Economies that are rich and industrial-
ized have sharply reduced demographic growth, preferring a few
well-educated, high-quality, and happy children to large families. In
many of them, in fact, birth rates have fallen beneath replacement
rates. Poor countries, at least for the time being, are still subject to
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growing populations. If they were to grow as rich as the industrialized
West, world population could well take a sharp nosedive.
To turn to technological progress, the limitations of the knowledge
base also no longer impose as much of a constraint on the development
of the economy as before. The limitations of primitive techniques have
slowly made way for a better understanding. Modern science has
made us understand, at least to some extent, why the techniques we
have work, and how we can build on them and improve them. Farm-
ers today fertilize the soil understanding soil chemistry and breed ani-
mals understanding genetics, which makes both processes more
effective, even though neither of them is a modern invention. Not all
production techniques are equally well understood, but in many areas
it is clear that an engineer today has a far better grasp of the physics
and chemistry at work than his forebears did in 1750. What this does
for us is exclude a large number of avenues that are known to be blind
alleys, and so research is made vastly more efficient. All the same, by
the standards of efficiency employed by economists, the search for
new useful knowledge remains unbelievably wasteful. New inven-
tions cannot be custom ordered according to need.
Of course, there are still many things we would like to do and can-
not — and an infinity of things that are in principle feasible, which we
do not even know that we do not know. It is also quite plausible that
the science of the 21st century will be sneered at by future scientists, as
we do at phlogiston theory and the notion of miasmas. All the same, at
least in the sense of its ability to perform in the economic arena, our
knowledge has experienced a huge advance in the past centuries.
When did all this begin? There is a long and inconclusive debate
between specialists on the role of the Scientific Revolution of the 17th
century in bringing about the Industrial Revolution of the late 18th
century.28 Be that as it may, the period between the Industrial Revolu-
tion and the late 20th century has given rise to a strong complementar-
ity between science and technology that has replaced the old model of
production. Science and technology affect one another in complex
ways. The most obvious story is that science prepares the ground for
technology. The “standard linear model” has long been abandoned in
which scientific discovery precedes inventions, and technology is
nothing but applied science which itself stems from “pure” science.
Technology leads to more science just as much as science provides the
knowledge base for new technology. It has created a positive feedback
circle the likes of which has never been witnessed.
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The feedback from technology “back” to science works in a variety
of ways, including:
1. Focusing Devices
In a classic article first published in 1969, Nathan Rosenberg coined the
concept of “focusing devices.”29 Technology poses well-defined prob-
lems to engineers and scientists, and focuses their attention on some
areas that turn out to be fruitful for further research. Techniques that
are found to be working, for one reason or another, raise the curiosity
of scholars: Why do they work? What are the principles behind them?
It influences the research agenda of society. If such research is under-
taken, then it enriches the base upon which technology rests and at the
same time raises further puzzles. Many classic examples can be cited of
such compulsive sequences, none more famous than the steam engine,
which became operational in 1712 with the first Newcomen engine.
This spurred a great deal of research into the laws governing energy
efficiency, leading eventually to the development of thermodynamics.
Thermodynamics, in its turn, could suggest how to make the engines
more efficient as well as the limits to their efficiency.
2. Artificial Revelation
The other channel through which the feedback from technological
knowledge to abstract knowledge works, especially stressed by Derek
Price, is through research tools, instruments, and laboratory equip-
ment.30 The basic point is very simple. Our senses limit us to a fairly
narrow slice of the universe that has been called a “mesocosm.” We
cannot see things that are too far away, too small, or not represented in
the visible light spectrum. The same is true for our other senses, for the
ability to make very accurate measurements, for overcoming optical
and other sensory illusions, and for the computational ability of our
brains. Technology helps us overcome the limitations that evolution
has placed on us and learn of natural phenomena that we were not
designed to see or hear.31 Without sophisticated computers, most
branches of modern science would today be unimaginable. And the
same is true for a variety of instruments, from precision clocks to fine
scales and measuring instruments, without which experimental sci-
ence is impossible.32 Many such inventions were quite adventitious, as
Price has noted.
Joel Mokyr
47
3. Rhetoric of Knowledge
A third way in which technology “feeds back” into science is through
the rhetoric of technology. Techniques are not “true” or “false.” Either
they work or they do not, and thus they help confirm or refute the
knowledge on which they are based. Science is consensual, and mathe-
matics and experiment are used to persuade others to accept proposi-
tions. Nothing, however, persuades us that knowledge is true as well
as the day-to-day demonstration of its efficacy in production. To put it
crudely, the way we are convinced that science is true is that its recom-
mendations visibly work.33 Chemistry works — it makes nylon tights
and polyethylene sheets. Physics works — airplanes fly and pressure
cookers cook rice. Every time. Strictly speaking, this is not a correct
inference because a functional technique could be based on knowledge
that turns out to be false. However, successful techniques transform
conjecture and hypothesis into an accepted fact, ready to go into text-
books and to be utilized by engineers, physicians, or farmers. At the
same time, the interaction may work the other way as well. Techniques
may be “selected” because they are implied by a set of knowledge that
is gaining acceptance, or by an “authority” whose social position in the
world of knowledge induces others to pick techniques on the basis of
his or her opinions. This is true when the efficacy of a technique is hard
to observe directly. Consumers do not actually observe the positive
long-term effect that daily doses of aspirin have on preventing heart
disease, but trust the scientific insights that suggest it. Such techniques
can be highly unstable in their popularity if the knowledge on which
they are based is not very solid, as the recent case of hormone replace-
ment therapy demonstrates.
The idea that techniques in use can buttress the knowledge on
which they are based is not new. The 18th-century British potter Josiah
Wedgwood felt that his experiments in the pottery actually tested the
theories of his friend Joseph Priestley, and professional chemists,
including Lavoisier, asked him for advice. During the 19th century, the
general confidence in scientific knowledge was reinforced by the
undeniable fact that the techniques based on it worked. Thus, the Scot-
tish engineer and scientist William Rankine, one of the first to apply
the newly discovered science of thermodynamics to engines, studied
the effects of steam expansion, which led him to recommend applying
steam-jacketing to heat the cylinder (a technique previously tried but
abandoned). One of his students, John Elder, used his work to develop
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the two-cylinder compound marine engine in the 1850s, which sealed
the eventual victory of steam over sailing ships. The superior perfor-
mance of these new machines served as confirmation of the new phys-
ical theories. In a different area, once biologists discovered that insects
could be the vectors of pathogenic micro-parasites, insect-fighting
techniques gained wide acceptance. The success of these techniques in
eradicating yellow fever and malaria was the best confirmation of the
hypotheses about the transmission mechanisms of the diseases, and
helped earn them wide support.
Finally, the period after 1750 witnessed a slow and rather uneven
decline in the institutional negative feedback. Rent-seeking and oppor-
tunistic behavior have never disappeared from any society, but the rise
of the bureaucratic Western nation-state, strongly influenced by
Enlightenment ideals of the role of the state, the rule of law, and the
notions of political economy, produced governments that limited their
own ability to tax their citizens and increasingly protected entrepre-
neurs and innovators from those who would try to expropriate the
fruits of their labor. Monopolies and exclusive, entry-limiting organi-
zations, such as guilds, were restricted and, when possible, eliminated.
Tariffs, the most widely used tool to protect local interests from com-
petition, became less popular while in the decades after 1815, free-
trade doctrines won uncertain and at times temporary triumphs over
protectionism. The notion that states were social contracts between cit-
izens and rulers, and that the function of the state was to protect pri-
vate property, enforce contracts, and step in only if and when free
markets demonstrably failed, slowly gained ground in Europe after
1789. The liberal bourgeois states that emerged created the institu-
tional support that industrial capitalism needed, and placed limits on
rapacious rent-seekers. Fraud, corruption, graft, and opportunistic
activity became recognized as antisocial behavior. Reform, whether
carried out by zealous French administrators in occupied regions or by
nations like Prussia carrying out defensive reforms, was inevitably
influenced by the concepts of the 18th-century Enlightenment. More-
over, on the global level, between 1815 and 1914, attacks of strong but
poor states against smaller but economically successful units did not
take place. Indeed, the Pax Britannica essentially meant that power
and wealth coincided, and that industrialized nations did not have to
fear predators threatening their wealth. Imperialism meant that the
military balance shifted, temporarily, in favor of the haves against the
have-nots, so that the rich could rob the poor and get even richer. Unfair
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and unjust as that may sound, it is another example of a negative feed-
back being replaced by a positive one.
V. Feedback between Institutions and Technology
I have discussed the transformation in the internal dynamics of tech-
nology and institutions, showing how the old negative feedbacks lost
their strength. This next model looks not just at feedback within tech-
nological or institutional factors but at the interactions between them.
As we have seen, institutions and technology can make an economy
grow through quite different mechanisms, but historically, of course,
interacted in complex ways. That technology affects institutions and
vice versa seems perfectly obvious. Let us consider the two directions
in turn.
A. From Technology to Institutions
The most obvious mechanism of feedback is when technology creates
the means by which markets operate. The developments in shipbuild-
ing technology and navigation in the 15th century in Europe not only
helped Europeans find the way to the Orient and America, but also
created a dense network of international trade both within Europe and
across the globe. The great commercial expansion of the 19th century
that generated so much wealth was made possible by declining trans-
port costs due to technological changes in land transport, shipbuilding,
and shipping techniques. The telegraph and other means of communi-
cation helped create and streamline the financial institutions and infor-
mation networks that made late 19th-century globalization possible.34
Technology also altered the military balance of power between indi-
viduals and the government, and helped create the centralized nation-
state, the institution that in the end set up and enforced many of the
rules by which the economic game is played in the modern age. It
made the rule of law feasible. The nation-state also created global
wars, mayhem, terror, and oppression. As always, technology can act
as a double-edged sword.
Another mechanism of feedback is that the new technology of the
Industrial Revolution created forms of business that were appropriate
to its special needs. At least two revolutionary forms of business orga-
nization emerged as a response to the new technology of the Industrial
Revolution. One of them is the factory. The factory is an inevitable con-
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sequence of the new technology, if not, perhaps, through the standard
mechanisms elucidated in the literature.35 It might be argued that facto-
ries proper are “organizations,” not institutions in the Northian sense,
but the factory system is a far deeper and more pervasive economic phe-
nomenon than the big, ugly, chimney-ridden brick buildings often
referred to as the “dark, Satanic mills.” The factory system implies
rules of behavior that differ from earlier work habits: discipline, punc-
tuality, coordination and cooperation with perfect strangers, the will-
ingness to accept monitoring and guidance (even when one was no
longer an apprentice), and the need to spend a large part of one’s life
away from home, working in an ordered environment and subject to
rules over which one has no control. This is what the new system stood
for and what the young Marx called alienation. Today’s corporate
cubicle and rush-hour traffic jam are the descendants of this transfor-
mation.
The other institutional response to the new technology is the large
business corporation, run by professional management, with a hierar-
chical structure, a separation between ownership and control, and the
emergence of sophisticated capital markets designed to cater to tech-
niques whose technical structure demands a large fixed investment
upfront. The technology that helped trigger these far-reaching institu-
tional changes in the United States was the railroad, as shown by
Alfred Chandler.36 The weakest part of this system, perhaps, was ven-
ture capital, that is, investment willing to take a chance on a new tech-
nology. Late 19th-century investment banks and the growth of
securities markets allowed investors to diversify enough to provide
innovators with some access to capital, even if this system did not
function perfectly by a long shot. Universal banks on the continent car-
ried out this function with considerable success, whereas in Britain,
institutional co-evolution with the new technology had a much more
tortuous history.37 All of these institutional changes were inspired and
driven by technology.
One can think of other interactions between technology and institu-
tions. Education and schooling have always been regarded as key to
the emergence and absorption of technology.38 Such assumptions may
have to be modified. Technical education was, for centuries, learned
effectively through apprentice-master channels, and many schools
insisted on teaching material that was worthless (or more drilling and
social conditioning than anything we would recognize as skill). In the
19th century that became insufficient. The new techniques demanded
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engineers, chemists, accountants, metallurgists, electricians, and many
other specialists with at least some understanding of the formal under-
pinnings of the techniques they were to operate. Technical universities
and polytechnic schools were founded throughout the continent in the
19th century, and these schools interacted closely with business enter-
prises to create advances in the frontier industries.39 They adapted to
industry’s needs, and industry changed its institutional structure to
accommodate them—a classic example of co-evolution.
B. From Institutions to Technology
The institutional framework helps determine the effectiveness of soci-
eties in generating new technology. It does so through a variety of
mechanisms. The first is the ability of society to generate new knowl-
edge. What is the research agenda regarding natural regularities, what is
motivating it, and in which areas is a society most interested? Do
philosophers, alchemists, and modern scientists receive signals about
what society might need and are they inclined to respond to them? Or
are they largely driven by epistemic motives, that is, their own curios-
ity or the curiosity of a small peer group? Many societies in antiquity
spent a great deal of time studying the movements of heavenly bodies,
which did little to butter the turnips (though it helped work out the
calendar). For many generations, Jewish sages spent their lives on the
exegesis of the scriptures, adding much to wisdom and legal scholar-
ship, but little to useful knowledge that could affect technology.
Beyond the question of the agenda, there is the question of alloca-
tion. How many and what kinds of resources are spent on generating
this new knowledge? How many people are engaged in the study of
natural regularities and how are they recruited and compensated?
What tools and instruments are employed?
Less obvious to economists but equally important is the matter of
selection criteria. How do we choose between competing theories, if
indeed we do? These standards are invariably socially set within para-
digms. For example, what constitutes logical “proof”? What is the
acceptable power of a statistical test? Do we always insist on double
blindness when testing a new compound? How many times need an
experiment be replicated before the consensus deems it sound? Who
are the “experts” and “authorities” who make these decisions, and
who appoints them? Much like in selection models in biology, we can
see environments in which selection was stringent. But this is not a
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necessary condition. A high-pressure intellectual environment forces
choices between incompatible views. In a low-pressure intellectual
environment, many “species” of knowledge can coexist in one mind,
even if by some logical standard they are mutually inconsistent. People
might believe that even if there are natural laws, they can somehow
generate exceptions, such as magic or miracles. Moreover, the selection
criteria are culturally contingent, and it is easy to envisage a cultural
climate in which the question “but is it true?” can be routinely
answered by “sometimes” or “maybe” or “if God wills it.”40 Further-
more, the selection criterion “is it true?” might have to compete with
such criteria as “is it beautiful?” or “is it morally uplifting?” or “is it
consistent with our traditions?” Western science, to be sure, is largely
consensual, and glaring inconsistencies are frowned upon. People
have to choose between incompatible or incommensurate theories and
will do so if they can, in some sense, rank them.41
The second channel is what happens to this knowledge once it is
generated. Who shares in it and how many share? What is the culture
of access? Is knowledge kept secret or inaccessible through impenetra-
ble codes and jargon or is it publicized as fast and as widely as possible
and further disseminated to wider audiences through popularizing
books, magazines, and TV programs? What kinds of languages and
symbols exist for practitioners to communicate with one another?
Beyond that, the people who are engaged in production need to com-
municate with those who study nature at a more experimental or theo-
retical level. The institutions that matter most here are the ones that
determine the communications and trust between those who know
things and those who make them. Do artisans, peasants, navigators,
and physicians have access to the cumulative scientific and other
knowledge bases they need? If not, can they approach or hire people
who do? Through much of history, the elite classes of philosophers
and mathematicians had little or no contact with the peasants and arti-
sans, and were little concerned with their needs. It is a hallmark of
technologically progressive societies that they have intellectuals with
“dirt under their fingernails,” as Lynn White once put it. Knowledge
has to “filter down” to the classes in charge of putting bread on the
table and clothes on the body, but the institutions that did this were
often absent.
The third channel is the application of this knowledge to the cre-
ation of “techniques.” Institutions set up the incentives — the payoffs
and penalties of innovation—and what the likelihood would be of suc-
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cessful resistance to the innovation, to suppress it and discourage oth-
ers. How will the person who makes the invention be compensated
and what other incentives are there to carry out the often dreary and
frustrating task of actually making techniques work? It should be kept
in mind that the history of science and technology is a history of “win-
ners.” We rarely have much information about the failed inventor or
investigator who spent a lifetime of search on an unattainable objec-
tive. Yet all researchers take that chance when they embark on a pro-
ject that may result in an invention.
Finally, the fourth channel is the diffusion of innovation. Assuming
that an invention is created, will it be adopted and find widespread
use in the economy? Historically, many societies have set up conserva-
tive institutions that explicitly or indirectly discourage and even block
innovators.42 In the past, technological innovation has run into conser-
vative resistance from a number of corners. First, vested interests,
thinking that inventions would cause unemployment or make assets
(including human capital like skills) less valuable, tried to fight inno-
vations when they could. Second, conservative organizations, for
instance governments worried about political instability or churches
worried about heresies, have tried to block innovation. Finally, well-
meaning groups, who felt that new technology for one reason or
another was undesirable in and of itself, have fought it. Today, some of
these groups target specific techniques (nuclear power, genetically
modified crops) and not others. Others find the techniques of modern
industrial capitalism abhorrent as a whole (e.g., the so-called Frankfurt
School).
But other institutional factors matter as well. For instance, will there
always be enough entrepreneurs who will take the initiative and
accept the risks of adopting a new technique? If there are, can they con-
trol the resources needed to make the technique work properly? Do
capital markets provide the venture capital and do labor markets sup-
ply the necessary complementary skills? Many technological disap-
pointments can be attributed to coordination failures. Such failures
might be resolved by an agent acting as coordinator, if other agents
recognize him as such. (Often, but not always, government agencies
carry out that function.) Yet, it is easy to demonstrate that in many
such cases the coordination failed, and industries, sectors, and entire
countries remain stuck in “poverty traps.”43
Institutions interact with innovations in that they determine the
likelihood that innovations will yield economically significant results.
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Without entrepreneurs, venture capital, and schools that train techni-
cians to build and maintain the new equipment, new techniques will
not diffuse rapidly. One might say that innovations open doors, and
institutions invite or prohibit the economy from walking through.
Institutions will affect the way knowledge is created as well as the way
it is diffused. To start with, they determine the payoffs or penalties to
innovators. One can see, on the one extreme, a set of reactionary insti-
tutions such as the Holy Inquisition, which threatened Giambattista
Della Porta, the Neapolitan inventor of an egg-hatching incubator
(circa 1588), with the stake as a dangerous heretic. At the other
extreme, there is a society, such as ours, in which great inventors like
William Shockley and Jack Kilby are rewarded with both enormous
riches and hugely prestigious awards, such as the Nobel Prize. Each
society has to come to grips with the deep ambiguities of technology.
On the one hand, innovation is the key to riches. On the other hand, it
is an act of rebellion, of disrespect toward tradition and custom, as
well as a destabilizing, disruptive, and potentially dangerous force. In
between those two poles, most societies have taken some kind of mid-
dle ground, trying to maintain safeguards on social stability without
freezing technology in place.
VI. The Enlightenment and the Origins of Growth
With the stage set, I now argue that in the European historical experi-
ence of the late 17th and 18th centuries, we can find an event that
turned the feedback from negative to positive. That event is something
that I will call the Industrial Enlightenment. We typically associate the
Enlightenment with mid-18th-century political and social thinkers,
especially in France and Scotland, where great minds like Rousseau,
Diderot, Montesquieu, David Hume, and Adam Smith were rethink-
ing the relationship between the individual and society. But part of it
concerned the generation and diffusion of the useful arts, and the
application of this knowledge to industry and agriculture. It is
arguable that the intellectual roots of this movement go back all the
way to Francis Bacon in the early 17th century and the argument that
knowledge of nature should serve our material needs. For most of the
century, this idea, though widely circulated by those who tried to ped-
dle their intellects to rich and powerful patrons, remained more an
ideal than a policy recommendation. The institutions that governed
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access costs were slowly changing, however, and these changes make
the Industrial Revolution less difficult to understand.
The Industrial Enlightenment had a triple purpose. First, it sought
to reduce access costs to technological knowledge by surveying and
cataloging artisan practices in the dusty confines of workshops in
order to determine superior techniques and propagate them through
the publication of technical manuals and encyclopedias. Thus, it would
lead to a wider adoption and diffusion of best-practice techniques and
a rationalization of the production process. Second, it sought to under-
stand why techniques worked by generalizing them, trying to connect
them to one another and relate them to what was then known as “nat-
ural philosophy.” The bewildering complexity and diversity of the
world of techniques in use was to be reduced to a finite set of general
principles governing them. These insights would lead to extensions,
refinements, and improvements, as well as speed up and streamline
the process of invention. Third, it sought to facilitate the interaction
between those who catalogued and understood natural phenomena
(or thought they did) and those who carried out the techniques.44 The
philosophes of the Enlightenment echoed Bacon’s call for cooperation
and the sharing of knowledge between those who investigate nature
and those who might use their conclusions to put more bread on the
table. Yet in the 1750s, when the first volumes of the Grande Ency-
clopédie were published, this was still little more than a dream. A cen-
tury later, it had become a reality. What made Bacon’s vision into a
reality was the Industrial Revolution. In their zeal for looking for eco-
nomic factors in the Industrial Revolution, what economic historians
may have overlooked is its intellectual origins in the Enlightenment.
The Industrial Enlightenment took many concrete forms. Above all,
it established clear channels of communication between those who
knew things, the savants, and those who made them, the fabricants. Sci-
entific organizations, often known confusingly as literary and philo-
sophical societies, sprung up everywhere in Europe. They organized
lectures, symposia, public experiments, and discussion groups, in
which the topics included the best pumps to drain mines or the advan-
tages of growing clover and grass.45 The British Society of Arts,
founded in 1754, was a classic example of an organization that embod-
ied many of the ideals of the Industrial Enlightenment. Its purpose was
“to embolden enterprise, to enlarge science, to refine art, to improve
manufacture and to extend our commerce.” Its activities included an
active program of awards and prizes for successful inventors; over
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6,200 prizes were granted between 1754 and 1784.46 The society took
the view that patents were a monopoly, and that no one should be
excluded from useful knowledge. It therefore ruled out (until 1845) all
persons who had taken out a patent from being considered for a prize,
and even toyed with the idea of requiring every prizewinner to com-
mit to never take out a patent.47 It served as a clearinghouse for techno-
logical information, reflecting the feverish growth of supply and
demand. But France and the rest of the continent were never far
behind and in some areas led Britain. The greatest Enlightenment doc-
ument, d’Alembert’s and Diderot’s Grande Encyclopédie, was also a
great technological document, with thousands of minute descriptions
of machines, devices, chemical processes, farming techniques, and so
on.48 The Industrial Enlightenment also created an accessible language
of technology by defining units and terms, and insisting on the unifica-
tion and standardization of weights and measures. It did all it could to
lower the barriers that national boundaries and languages imposed
and to fight the inertia imposed by conservatism, selfishness, and igno-
rance.
The Industrial Enlightenment could occur, in part, because of a
major institutional change. In the 16th and 17th centuries, practical
knowledge in Europe underwent a transformation. Discoveries about
nature were no longer kept secret, as had been customary in the Mid-
dle Ages, but were diffused as soon as possible, with credit going for
priority.49 This notion, still very much in force today, vastly reduced
access costs within and across different countries. At the same time, it
was also increasingly understood that inventions (new production
techniques, as distinct from scientific discoveries) needed to be pro-
tected and awarded some form of intellectual property rights if would-
be inventors were to allocate the required time, effort, and resources.
How to reward those whose patience and ingenuity enriched soci-
ety remained a dilemma. There were a number of alternative mecha-
nisms, all imperfect, that this could be done. First, there was always
the first-mover’s advantage. The inventor usually enjoyed a few years
of relative peace before imitators could pick up the idea and encroach
upon his monopoly. Second, such advantages could be extended by
keeping a novel technique secret. Of course, some techniques were
easy to copy or reverse engineer, and for those secrecy probably was
not an option. Even when it was, industrial espionage was well devel-
oped and labor mobility was sufficient to make this option fairly
weak.50 Third, the inventor could apply for a subsidy or a prize. In the
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British case, it could come from the Society of Arts or, in a few cases,
from Parliament itself. In France, a formal government committee
appointed by the Royal Academy routinely awarded such prizes and
medals. Fourth, the patent system provided a legal underpinning in
which the inventor “owned” the right to the invention and could either
exploit it himself (collecting the temporary monopoly rents) or license
it out for a fee. Once a patent was taken out, secrecy was no longer an
option because, in 1778, the British courts decreed that patent specifi-
cations should be sufficiently precise and detailed so as to fully explain
it to a technically educated person.
In this fashion, the intellectual changes in the 18th century gradu-
ally transformed the way in which institutions affected technology.
Behind it lay the deeper utilitarian notion of classical political economy
that institutions are to be rational, that is, measured and tested by the
degree to which they serve the material well-being of society as a
whole. The main event of the Industrial Revolution was still technolog-
ical change. Other factors, such as credit, labor, transportation, urban-
ization, foreign trade, and demographic change, all played roles in
bringing it about, but it is the positive feedback mechanisms within the
sphere of useful knowledge and those between useful knowledge and
institutions that changed the course of history. But these intellectual
origins themselves were forged in the previous century through what
we call the Scientific Revolution and through the Industrial Enlighten-
ment.
These linkages go some way toward explaining the rise of the West.
The historiography of Western economic change in the past centuries
is always torn between those who praise it and view it as mankind’s
salvation from poverty and backwardness, and those who, with the
gloom-and-doom of the Frankfurt School, view it as a curse and a cata-
strophe that has turned civilization into barbarism. The extreme pes-
simists believe that technology will eventually bury us all, whether
through a nuclear war, environmental disaster, or the insidious effect
of crass materialism and free enterprise commercialism. Such debates
are inherently inconclusive and almost always about half-full, half-
empty glasses. What seems undeniable is the enormity of the event.
At first glance, Europe in 1700 seems not all that different from the
rest of the world. To be sure, it had just found the sailing routes to
every continent, established trade routes, and engaged in an aggres-
sive program to adopt crops and techniques it had found in other cul-
tures. But these activities involved only a small proportion of the
Macalester International Vol. 13
58
population and affected only a small fraction of all economic activity.
The further one lived from the Atlantic ports, the less access one had to
these goods. What set Europe apart were intellectual changes: the
Renaissance followed by the Scientific Revolution and the Enlighten-
ment. No other society experienced anything like it. It was a deep intel-
lectual transformation into the possibility and desirability of social and
material progress and the social potential of human reasonableness—a
belief that survived the refutation of the perfectibility of humans and
human institutions. But beyond the fragile belief in progress, the
Industrial Enlightenment created something much more lasting: the
means and tools for technological progress to actually occur. Two cen-
turies after Bacon’s program, European societies created the institu-
tions that could bring it about and that ended the processes of
self-extinction that had characterized earlier episodes of economic
expansion.
VII. Final Thoughts
Returning to the question of differences in income, we can phrase the
issue perhaps most meaningfully as the two following propositions.
The first proposition is that differences in institutions help explain dif-
ferences in income levels in cross-section at a given moment. Knowl-
edge can and does flow across national boundaries, if not always with
the frictionless ease and speed that some economists imagine. If the
only reason that Germany is richer than Zimbabwe today is that Ger-
many possesses more useful knowledge, the difference might be elimi-
nated in a relatively short time. In reality, the chief reason for the
difference is that the institutions in most Western nations are more
amenable to economic growth than in many non-Western ones. These
institutions tend to be persistent and, unlike knowledge, better institu-
tions do not easily “diffuse” across national boundaries.51 It turns out
to be easier for countries like Pakistan to import Western nuclear tech-
nology than to import institutions that will allow its economic and
political processes to allocate resources in an efficient way and to avoid
the worst excesses of rent-seeking.
The second proposition is that in recent history differences in
knowledge have become increasingly important in explaining growth
over time. If we were to ask why Germany is richer today than it was in
1815, the importance of technology becomes unassailable — though
better institutions might still be of importance as well. The statements
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are thus of degree, not of absolutes; but in economic history, degree is
everything.
Whether one is an optimist or a pessimist about the effects of eco-
nomic growth on the human condition, it is undeniable that the Indus-
trial Revolution remains the central event of the economic and social
history of the past half millennium, simply because it altered the mate-
rial lives of more people in more radical ways than any other event in
recorded history. It is not only that worldwide income increased by a
huge factor. The Industrial Revolution meant that technological
progress turned from a sporadic stroke of brilliance or luck that
allowed a society suddenly to build windmills or print books, to a
steady, continuous string of events. Because of relentless innovation,
we have come to expect things to get better. We demand that human
knowledge be applied to all our material problems and that things
improve all the time; newer cars and computers are more efficient and
have more options because they embody this year’s technology, which
is more advanced than last year’s. We demand that technology solve
the scourges of our age — AIDS, traffic jams, pollution, terrorism.
When it does not, we feel frustrated and disappointed. We expect tech-
nology to help solve our mental and spiritual problems as well. If we
are depressed, give us Prozac. If Prozac has bad side effects, invent
something that does not. We fully expect technology to extend youth
and life itself. This expectation itself is new. Before the Industrial Revo-
lution, and even during much of the 19th century, people were happy
with innovation, delighted in cheap cotton clothes, rode their new
trains, and enjoyed technology’s achievements, from telegraph to anes-
thetics. They saw these as temporary windfalls, however, not as har-
bingers of a society in which the only constant thing about technology
was change itself, to paraphrase Heraclitus.
Knowledge is not like any other economic entity. Science fiction is
full of techniques that are imaginable but not feasible. History is full of
examples of techniques that were feasible but simply did not occur to
anyone—and there is no reason why our age should be all that differ-
ent. Some things, however, may well be beyond us, and others may
well be physically impossible. Technological history illustrates, over
and over again, that it is human fate that we cannot always tell the pos-
sible from the impossible. All the same, what seem to be failures of
technology are often the failures of institutions.
Progress in useful knowledge has not been accompanied every-
where by more enlightened institutions. Science and technology have
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not brought universal bliss, let alone the perfection of humans. There
have been deep disappointments, and we are slowly but certainly
reaching a better understanding about why the institutions that gov-
ern our lives are so hard to “get right.” The history of the West shows
asymmetric progress, with advances in technological knowledge
steadily progressing whereas “progress” in institutions seems to be
much less pronounced and monotonic. Rational, well-meaning people
often designed institutions that completely misfired and inflicted end-
less misery. Unraveling the mysteries of nature has turned out to be
much easier than unraveling the complexities of human interaction.
One can easily point to the great institutional failings of the 20th cen-
tury, such as the rise of totalitarianism, racism, and genocide. Yet even
in our own time, the many difficulties and obstacles in combating
AIDS and global pollution, for example, are not only in the technology,
nor in a will to succeed, but in the failure to overcome opportunistic
behavior and coordination problems.52 The positive feedback between
technology and institutions has improved both, but the effects have
still been highly unevenly distributed between the two. Institutions
and the human behavior that gives rise to them are far more difficult to
refine and perfect than human control over the natural environment.
Without those improvements, however, the enormous control that
homo sapiens now exert over the forces of nature may become a fright-
ful development indeed.
All the same, for much of humanity, life is longer, more comfort-
able, and less painful and uncertain than before. The material plea-
sures that once were only attainable by the very rich and powerful
have become increasingly available to more and more people, to the
point that many feel it unjust that they are not yet available to the 
rest of humanity. Such a thought would have been sheer insanity in
1750. 
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